

INTRODUCTION

The causes of the end of the Cold War remain one of the most important, and highly contested, debates in the study of international politics. Numerous scholars have detailed the effects that variables such as economic decline, relative power shifts, identity and behavioral changes, and complex learning, to name probably the most prominent examples, had on bringing the Cold War to a close (Haas, 2007: 145-146). This essay is to bring out the factors that led to the end of the Cold War. However an attempt will be made to elaborate on the meaning and concept of the Cold War, Soviet Union – United States relationship before the Cold War, and some factors that led to the Cold War. The years 1986-91 were the end game of the Cold War. End games of the cold war is said to be highly path dependent (Lebow, 1999: 27). The essay shall proceed to find out whether cold war has really ended or otherwise.

MEANING/CONCEPT OF COLD WAR

In his *International Relations*, V. N. Khanna states that the term Cold War was first used by Walter Lippmann by referring to a war-like-situation between two power blocs, yet it was not a war. This could also mean a subtle loud-less but noticeable war that exist between two factions, states, etc. In relation to International politics, cold war becomes a ‘diplomatic war’, devoid of armed conflict between two or more Powers. The Cold War could also be described as ‘peace time unarmed warfare’. It was essentially based on ideological hatred and political distrust that erupted between Russia and the USA right after World War II. These two emerging power blocs were-friendly-enemies who constantly carried on diplomatic manoeuvring to achieve one-upmanship as they opposed or demonstrated a strong animosity to each other ideologically. In this sense, the cold war

could be said to be an ideological war fought mainly between the two newly emerged superpowers – United States of America and Soviet Union, after the end of the Second World War. According to Khanna (2004), the war was used for an acute tension that developed between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and that it started right after the end of World War II in August, 1945 (Khanna, 2004: 263-4). According to Larking (1965), this ideological battle, Cold War, was a mixture of religious crusade in favour of one ideology or the other, and of the most ruthless power politics, striking out for advantage or expansion not only in Europe but all over the world (Larkin, 1965). The Cold War, partly because it remained cold or covert, has already lasted longer than the World War I (1914-18) and World War II (1939-45) combined (Brian, 1968: 183). In other context, the Cold War became geopolitical, ideological, and economic struggle between two world superpowers, the USA and the USSR, that started in 1947 at the end of the Second World War and lasted until the dissolution of the Soviet Union on December 26, 1991 (Theodoros II, 2013).

THE RELATIONSHIP THAT EXISTED BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SOVIET UNION DURING THE WORLD WAR II

According to Khanna (2004), a strange alliance had come into existence after German invasion of the Soviet Union in June and Japanese bombardment of Pearl Harbour in December 1941. The Socialist State of the Soviet Union and the most powerful Capitalist State America found themselves as close allies and determined to defeat Fascist dictatorship. This friendship became necessary in order to contain and defeat Germany at the time. These two countries along with other

countries, notably Britain, France, and China were able to win a decisive war and defeated Nazi-Fascist Axis.

However, the friendship had developed tensions even during the war. The strained relations developed into strange new type of war fought without weapons, Cold War. Khanna states that nobody expected Cold War till the summer of 1945 that the alliance would collapse like a pack of cards the moment the enemy was vanquished. The cementing force – common enmity of the Axis – was not so powerful as to last permanently, or for long (Khanna, 2004: 263). The friendly relationship that existed among these two powers was nowhere going to last because it just happened as a marriage of convenience whereby couples join together, not for love.

It has been recognized that at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945 the goodwill among the Allies (USA-USSR) was so clearly visible that none could expect a cold war within a few months time. As the War II was nearing its end, differences among the Allies were growing in number as well as intensity. Yalta Conference was convened to overcome these differences. Another motive of the Conference was ailing President Roosevelt's anxiety to bring the Soviet Union into war against Japan. According to Khanna, the two had concluded in 1941 a five year treaty of non-aggression, but in view of continued belligerence of Japan, the United States felt it necessary to persuade Soviet Union to declare war against Japan.

In relation to the above, Russia took a softer line (it could not stick to the actual proposal) and Stalin agreed to do so three months after the war ended in Europe. The atmosphere at Yalta became so cordial that the Western leaders were convinced of lasting friendship. Prime Minister Churchill told the House of Commons on 27 February, 1945 that the Soviet leaders wanted friendship with the Western democracies so that mutual trust and cooperation could develop between them.

Churchill said that he trusted the Soviet leaders' words as their commitment. Harry Hopkins of the United States was also confident of the far-sightedness of the Soviet leadership and of lasting friendship between the Western democracies and the Soviet Union. But these hopes were soon dashed. The friendship was not a genuine one because of the position of the Soviet Union – communism – and the USA – liberalism (Khanna, 2004: 263 - 264).

CAUSES OF THE COLD WAR

There was a constant military competition and espionage. There were two well-defined power blocs. There was the American Bloc, or Anglo-American Bloc, or the Western Bloc, or the Democratic Bloc. The Communists dubbed it as the Imperialist Bloc or the Capitalist Bloc. The rival bloc was led by the Soviet Union and was known as the Eastern Bloc, or Soviet Bloc, or Socialist Bloc, and the Western critics described it as Communist Bloc or the Totalitarian Bloc (Khanna, 2004: 264).

In this diplomatic war, the United States tried to project the Soviet Union as the enemy of world peace; and Communism as destroyer of individual freedom. America kept on propagating that USSR was an expansionist State, an imperialist power which had not only installed Communist regimes by force in the East European countries but even crushed Hungarian and Czechoslovak communist leaders who desire to act independently of Soviet control and free from Russian domination. On the other hand, Soviet leadership described the Americans as colonialists, imperialists and capitalist exploiters (Khanna, 2004: 264 – 265; Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 100).

According to Khanna (2004), there were several causes for the origin of the Cold War. Some writers prefer to rely on theories based on analysis of numerous wars and peace, while others

depend more on what actually happened during and after the war, that caused high level of tension leading to the Cold War (Khanna, 2004: 267). The cause of the Cold War is debatable. Because the Cold War doubles as a conflict between two countries (the USA and the USSR) and between two ideologies (Capitalism and Communism) several different causes can be suggested as follows:

The abandonment of war time policy of collaboration. Second World War, the United States deliberately abandoned the wartime policy of collaboration and, exhilarated by the possession of the atomic bomb, undertook a course of aggression of its own designed to expel all Russian influence from Eastern Europe and to establish democratic-capitalist states on the very border of the Soviet Union. As the revisionists see it, this radically new American policy or rather this resumption by Truman of the pre-Roosevelt policy of insensate anti-communism left Moscow no alternative but to take measures in defense of its own borders. The result was the Cold War (Schlesinger Jr., 1967: 25).

The Concept of Vacuum. A significant explanation of the origin of the Cold War is the concept of vacuum. The defeat of Germany was one of the major changes that occurred after the Second World War. After the war, with the decline of Great Powers such as Britain and France, left World power largely in the hands of the Soviet Union and the United States. As each power attempted to dominate, conflicts were inevitable since they could not cooperate with each other to fill the vacuum (Khanna, 2004: 268). Realism, the most prominent structural explanation, conceives of the Cold War as a power struggle and the almost inevitable consequence of the power vacuum created in Central Europe by the collapse of Germany at the end of World War II. Some realists contend that the conflict assumed an added dimension because of the bipolar structure of the

postwar world which transformed a regional conflict into a global one. it has been stated that Realists are found on both sides of the definition divide. Those who embrace the wider definition argue that the Cold War ended when one of the poles (the Soviet Union) recognized that it was no longer able to compete. Gorbachev's foreign policy was an attempt to extricate the Soviet Union from its conflict with the West on the best possible terms (Lebow, 1999: 22).

Divergent Post-War Objectives. The post-war objectives of the two were not identical. Soviet Union was determined to establish its domination over the East European countries which she hoped to (and did) liberate from Nazi Germany. The Soviet leadership argued that all invaders of Russia, in the past, had come from Eastern Europe. USSR therefore, wanted friendly governments in the countries bordering her territory. Western countries did not realize that by ‘friendly governments’, the USSR meant communist governments. The Western leaders were aware of the likelihood of USSR emerging as a very powerful state once Germany was defeated. Britain and the United State were keen on holding free elections in the liberated countries and setting up of democratic governments. Churchill and Roosevelt insisted at the Yalta Conference (February 1945) that free elections must be held; Stalin agreed. But, this promise was not kept. As the Soviet army liberated East European countries, it installed Communist regimes without holding the promised elections. This became a major cause of annoyance of U.S.A and Britain (Khanna, 2004: 270; Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 99, Theodoros II, 2013).

Churchill’s Fulton Speech. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill, the then leader of the opposition in Britain, delivered a speech at Fulton, Missouri in the presence of President Truman. He sharply criticized the Soviet and said that the Soviet Union had erected an “iron curtain” at the

dividing line between the East and West so that nothing that transpired in the Soviet satellite countries could be known in the West. He described Soviet actions as threat to democracy, freedom, and Christian civilization. Churchill called for an Anglo-American alliance “to champion freedom and protect Christian civilization.” Truman responded to this call and decided upon the policy of “containment of communism.” President Truman sacked his Commerce Secretary, Henry A. Wallace, who had appealed for Soviet-American entente on September 12, 1946. From April, 1946 onwards, both the sides began publicly accusing each other and mutual hostility became a normal feature. Soviet leaders later said that Churchill’s Fulton speech was a declaration of Cold War (Khanna, 2004: 275).

Capitalism and Communism are usually seen as antithetical (differences of ideology), it can be argued that the Cold War began when Communism began, in 1917 with the Russian Revolution. Or, if not quite in 1917, then in early 1920s, when Lenin and his Bolsheviks consolidated their power in Russia and tried to spread Communism to the West, to Europe on the blade of their swords—although they were rather quickly unsuccessful, being defeated by the Poles in the Polish-Soviet War [1919-1921]. The hegemonic nature of the communist doctrine meant that the governments of most capitalist states viewed communist states such as the Soviet Union with mistrust and feared the spread of communism. This led the ‘red scare’ in the United States. The economic and political systems of the two countries were different and the two openly denounced each other’s system (Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 99; Khanna, 2004; Theodoros II, 2013).

Poland. Another commonly argued cause of the Cold War is, fittingly enough, the beginning of World War II in Europe: 1939. The Soviet Union, now under Stalin, had signed a secret pact with

Germany's Hitler, and both countries attacked Poland in September of that year. At Tehran, and at the next major conference of the Big Three at Yalta in 1945, the leaders of the US, UK, and USSR were able to reach a number of important agreements—settling border disputes, creating the United Nations, organizing the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan. But Poland remained a vexing problem. At Yalta, Stalin—insisting that "Poland is a question of life or death for Russia"—was able to win Churchill's and Roosevelt's reluctant acceptance of a Communist-dominated provisional government for Poland. In exchange, Stalin signed on to a vague and toothless "Declaration of Liberated Europe," pledging to assist "the peoples liberated from the dominion of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems." The agreements allowed Churchill and Roosevelt to claim they had defended the principle of self-determination, even though both knew that Poland had effectively been consigned to the Soviet sphere of interest. The provisional Communist government in Poland later held rigged elections (which it, not surprisingly, won), nominally complying with the Declaration of Liberated Europe even though no alternative to Communist rule ever really had a chance in the country.

In the end, the Yalta agreements were not so much a true compromise as a useful (in the short term) misunderstanding among the three leaders. Stalin left happy he had won Anglo-American acceptance of de facto Soviet control of Eastern Europe; Roosevelt and Churchill left happy they had won Stalin's acceptance of the principle of self-determination. But the two parts of the agreement were mutually exclusive; what would happen if the Eastern Europeans sought to self-determine themselves out of the Soviet orbit? Future disputes over the problematic Yalta

agreements were not just likely; they were virtually inevitable (Khanna, 2004: 272; Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 97 – 98; shmoop University; 2015).

The Death of Roosevelt and Truman's Doctrine. The likelihood of future conflict only heightened on 12 April 1945, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt unexpectedly died of a brain hemorrhage. Vice President Harry S. Truman—a former Missouri senator with only a high-school education, who had served just 82 days as vice president suddenly became the President of the United States. Truman, who may not have ever known just how much Roosevelt had actually conceded to Stalin at Yalta, viewed the Soviets' later interventions in Eastern Europe as a simple violation of the Yalta agreements, as proof that Stalin was a liar who could never be trusted. Truman quickly staked out a hard-line position, resolving to counter Stalin's apparently insatiable drive for power by blocking any further expansion of the Soviet sphere of influence, anywhere in the world. Under Truman, containment of Communism soon came to dominate American foreign policy. The Cold War was on ((Khanna, 2004: 272; Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 102 – 104).

On March 12, 1947, Truman sent a message to the U. S. Congress. It contained the policy of 'containment', which meant to limit or contain Communism where it had then reached, so that it did not spread any further. Immediate provocation for the new policy was constant 'communist threat' to Greece and Turkey. In Greece guerilla activities of Leftists were threatening democracy and freedom. In respect to Turkey, Soviet Government was putting pressure for boundary changes and a strong position in the Straights of Bosphorous and Dardenelles. In 1946, Truman was willing to increase American economic assistance to these two countries. In his message to the Congress, President Truman sought authorization to extend to Greece and Turkey immediate economic and military assistance to the tune of 400 million dollars. This assistance was linked to the U. S. policy

of support to 'free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures'. This policy statement came to be known as the Truman Doctrine. Thus, Truman Doctrine was to be applied both against the guerillas (the armed minorities) and the foreign interference (outside pressure).

The doctrine was a stern warning to the Soviet Union to mend its ways. The terms 'aggressors' and 'imperialism' earlier used for the Fascist Powers now began to be used by the USSR for Britain and America. The division of the world into two power blocs was formalized, and the Soviet Union began describing the American Bloc as 'Warmongers' and used the term 'anti-imperialists' for themselves (Khanna, 2004: 275 - 276).

The nuclear missiles race. In 1959, Cuba had fallen under the leadership of Fidel Castro, who had rejected American influence to ally himself with the Soviets. In the fall of 1962, American spy planes discovered that Castro was installing Soviet nuclear missiles capable of quickly striking targets in the US. The United States navy blockaded Cuba, preventing Soviet deliveries of war materials. For a heart-stopping time the world lurched toward nuclear war. Eventually, Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev agreed to remove Soviet missiles on the island in exchange for the American withdrawal of equally strategically placed missiles from Turkey.

From 1962 to 1975, the United States was involved in the war in Vietnam, where the Soviets supplied the Viet Cong with munitions; while during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988, America supported the Afghan Mujahideen. Nevertheless American and Soviet soldiers were never to confront one other on a field of battle (Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 65, 102 – 103; Theodoros II, 2013).

Space Race. During the 1960s, the space race became a much more peaceful, and beneficial, battlefield- this time for technological and ideological superiority. The Soviets took the lead on October 4, 1957, when they launched Sputnik 1, the world's first artificial satellite. They followed up by shooting the first human, Yuri Gagarin, into space in 1961 and the first woman, Valentina Tereshkova, in 1963. Soviet cosmonaut Aleksei Leonov was the first to leave his spacecraft and go for a spacewalk, almost getting stuck out there in the process. The culmination of the space race occurred on July 20, 1969, when the US responded to the Soviet achievements with the Apollo 11 landing on the moon and Neil Armstrong's "giant leap for mankind" (Kegley & Blanton, 201-2013: 65, 102 – 103; Theodoros II, 2013).

FACTORS THAT BROUGHT ABOUT THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The end of the Cold War was a momentous development, a watershed in world politics that was both sudden and largely unexpected. This cluster of events – the end of bipolar rivalry, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the unification of Germany, far-reaching nuclear arms reductions and the end of international communism – all set the stage for a new era of world politics organized around American unipolarity and the hegemony of capitalism and liberal democracy. One era ended and a new one began (Deudney & Ikenberry, 2011). It has been argued to the larger extent that much

of the discussion of the end of the Cold War starts from the premise that Gorbachev's domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives set in motion a process that radically transformed the nature of East-West relations. The emphasis on the Gorbachev period is natural enough given the consensus among Western and Russian scholars that Gorbachev's domestic and foreign policies were the proximate cause of the end of the Cold War (Lebow, 1999: 21). The unexpected events since autumn 1989 have been explained in different ways by many people. It may be interesting to list them and compare them (Newcombe, 1997:32).

The first factor to examine is the economic decline. According to Brooks and Wohlforth (2000-2001), Soviet economic decline is often seen as a key reason why the Cold War ended. The Soviet Union's foreign policy was oriented toward Defence during the Cold War which made the economy to decline badly in 1970s because the power of Soviet's economy was determine by its extend of overpowering those of Western Countries with huge budget on Defence which enabled the Soviet Union lost her credibility of the economic ability to sustained Cold with the West leading to the economic sluggishness from 1970s and 1980s ((Petersen, 1993: 479 – 481). During the 1980s, the crumbling of the economic and political structures of the Soviet Union became increasingly apparent. By 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union was embroiled in disastrous economic problems. In addition, the Soviet satellite states in Eastern Europe were abandoning communism one after the other (Kegley & Blanton, 201-2013). This was followed by reformation from Eastern countries such as Hungary, Poland and Soviet Union toward a free market oriented policies Gorbachev knew very well that his country cannot compete with

United States in term of Defence budget spending which enabled him to come up with reform agenda of *Perestroika* [the restructuring of political and economic systems) and *Glasnost* (greater openness and individual freedom] (Kegley & Blanton, 201-2013: 104; Nyuon, 2012).

Another classical example that led to the economic decline of the **USSR is her involvement in the Congo crisis**. Mazov, (2007), opined that the USSR was in a weaker position in comparison to its main rival as at the time Lumumba was soliciting for help to stop the rebel activities in Katanga. Acting through Hammarskjold and the ‘Congolese Club’ in the UN Administration, the USA succeeded in using the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) forces as an effective instrument for exercising an extraordinary degree of influence to both contain ‘communist subversion’, and secure Western interests under the cover of the United Nations. This left the Soviet Union no choice but to influence the events mainly through allies, in order to avoid overt involvement and an armed clash with the other superpower (Mazov, 2007; Khanna, 2004).

At the end of July 1960, Lumumba returned empty handed from his trip to the USA. He had failed to obtain an American commitment to help in the withdrawal of the Belgian troops from the Congolese soil. Since he had no other alternative, he accepted the Soviet aid offer. The Soviet deliveries included hundreds of trucks with spare parts, while the number of Soviet planes supplied to Lumumba is still unclear. Russian trucks and planes were intensively used to transfer the central government’s troops to southern Congo. In late August 1960, the latter launched an offensive against Katanga and the other seceded province of Kasai, which bordered Katanga on the north. Within a week, Kasai’s forces were suppressed and troops loyal to Lumumba arrived on the

border of Katanga. These events compelled the USA to press Congo's President, Joseph Kasavubu, to oust Lumumba (Mazov, 2007; Khanna, 2004).

After Lumumba was ousted, his followers began to gather in the Oriental Province situated in the eastern part of the Congo. Antoine Gizenga, President of the *Parti de la Solidarite Africaine* and deputy Prime Minister of the Congo between June and September 1960, led the opposition to the central government in Leopoldville and declared himself acting Prime Minister after Lumumba's arrest. Gizenga regularly sent telegrams to Khrushchev asking for aid. The Soviet Union satisfied Gizenga's request for financial assistance: \$500,000 were granted to Gizenga's representatives in Cairo in two equal payments. With the \$250,000, Gizenga could afford to pay his soldiers (Mazov, 2007).

Soviet aid fuelled pro-Lumumba forces to the extent that they could repel the offensive of Mobutu troops, consolidate their hold over the Oriental Province and establish control over the Kivu Province and the northern part of Katanga. Arkadey Sobolev, in the period between December 1960 and March 1961 reveal that Czechoslovakia unsuccessfully tried to establish an airline route from Prague to Stanleyville via Cairo and Khartoum. Prague gave £25,000 to its embassy in Cairo for the Gizenga government, but it is doubtful whether the money ever reached Stanleyville (Mazov, 2007).

The assassination of Lumumba, which became publicly known on 13 February 1961, was a heavy blow to the prestige of the Soviet Union. Various passages in the special statement of the Soviet government gave Gizenga hope: 'The Prime-minister of the Congo died, but the legitimate government of the Republic of Congo, headed by his deputy Antoine Gizenga, continues to function. Located in Stanleyville, the provisional capital of the Republic, it controls over half of

the Congo's territory and enjoys peoples' support....It is necessary to give utmost aid to the national government of the Congo in Stanleyville' (Mazov, 2007).

From 14 February onwards, Mulele and Gizenga constantly sent urgent, almost desperate requests for support to the Kremlin. They wanted military and other aid, as well as a Soviet mission to Stanleyville to help counter imperialist subversion. On 7 March 1961, Mulele arrived in Moscow for an unofficial visit and spent a week conducting negotiations with the Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Vasily Kuznetsov, and other Soviet high officials. Mulele lamented that the Soviet aid was insufficient, and pushed for it to increase and to become more comprehensive.

According to Mulele, 'we failed to transfer the second portion of your financial aid (\$250,000) from Cairo to Stanleyville, because Sudan refused to grant a visa to our trusted person'. This sum had never reached Gizenga (Mazov, 2007).

In the conference on the Congolese crisis, held in the Woodrow Wilson International Center for scholars, Washington, DC on 23 – 24 September 2004, former CIA station chief Lawrence Devlin actually revealed how the CIA organized an operation to distract the courier carrying the money from Cairo to Stanleyville, and snatch the suitcase with the \$250,000. This is clear evidence as to how the Soviet economy declined (Mazov, 2007).

The two superpowers had ulterior motives for supporting the UN operation. US President Dwight Eisenhower was more interested in shielding the Congo from 'communist penetration'. The Kremlin leader Nikita Khrushchev, for his part, was trying to take advantage of the opportunity to expand Soviet influence as the leading opponent of colonialism and imperialism. Their contrasting objectives created a battle for supremacy in the Congo, and their rivalry was further fuelled by the key local actor, the Congo's Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, who was looking to both

East and West for help. Their interest, was in the open when the two super powers decided to support their respective allies in Congo in terms of arms, finance, and such likes. The USA in the end manage to cramp the Soviet economy (Mazov, 2007).

The second factor that could be linked to the first point is technological and industrial competition. Economic globalization created turmoil in the world economy at the end of the twentieth century, but the Western economies using market systems were able to transfer labour to services, to reorganize their heavy industries and to switch to computers. The Soviet Union could not keep up. For instance, when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, there were 50,000 personal computers in the Soviet Union; in the United States there were 30 million. Four years later, there were about 400,000 personal computers in the Soviet Union, and 40 million in the United States. According to one Soviet economist, by the late 1980s, only eight percent of Soviet industry was competitive at world standards. It is difficult to remain a superpower when 92 percent of industry is not competitive ((Petersen, 1993: 479 – 482).

The third factor still in connection to the *economy* is that **Soviet Union collapsed because of overspending on the arms race.** The Reagan administration deliberately pushed them into this by initiating the very costly Strategic Defense Initiative. But in doing so, the United States nearly bankrupted itself too. The worst recession (really a depression if the proper indicators were used) threatens capitalism to collapse as well as communism. But the U.S. economy was twice as big as the Soviet economy, and so could somewhat better tolerate the equally large defense expenditures of the two countries. Richardson arms race theory predicts that an arms race which does not reach

equilibrium but continues open-ended will end either in war or in bankruptcy. Fortunately for us all, the latter happened (Newcombe, 1997: 32).

The fourth factor to explore is the liquidation of Communist ideology; this factor has a greatest rationale for the cessation of Cold War because the communist blocs lost their prestige, the philosophy of Communism and its tenets making her supporters reluctant to support this dysfunctional ideology. The Soviet leadership led by Gorbachev came to realization that the entire system of Communism is defunct and could not compete with the Western ideology of capitalism making the west to win ideologically, thus, the west gave more pressure on the Soviet Union making them to win the Cold War through strong economy and acceptable ideology. The dysfunction of Communist ideology made the United States strategy to be successful in putting an end to communism by referring the ideology of communism as a nature of beast established within itself that create internal weakness, thus become vulnerable to external compressions. The conceptual heritages of Communism surprise death are credited to myriad of factors such as its ability to against the nature of human spirit, successive revolts which referring it as “the revolt of the soul against the soullessness of Communism” (Nyuo, 2012/3).

The fifth factor, In 1988/9, the Soviet Union abandoned its nine-year war in Afghanistan. Next, Gorbachev refused to send military support to defend the previous satellite states of the USSR, greatly weakening their Communist regimes. This was the backdrop for Gorbachev’s visit to East Berlin in the fall of 1989, where his speech advocating freedom of communication with the West spurred popular agitation in East Germany. Demanding reunion with their families, East Berliners pulled down parts of the Wall and climbed across into West

Berlin. *The destruction of the Berlin Wall*, of great symbolic importance, finished off the Iron Curtain, and the following year saw the reunification of Germany. Like dominoes, Eastern European communist dictatorships fell one by one. By the fall of 1989, East and West Germans were tearing down the Berlin Wall with pickaxes. Communist regimes were ousted in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia threw off the yoke of communism only to dissolve quickly into a violent civil war (Jackson, 1999: 389ff; Kegley & Blanton, 201-2013: 104)

The sixth factor is the failure of the *August Coup*. The same year the Berlin Wall was pulled down, the Russian Confederation convened a new congress, electing Boris Yeltsin as president and passing laws that ousted the Soviets from Russia. This kind of political and legal instability continued throughout 1990 and 1991 as many of the Soviet republics gradually became de facto independent. Most of the allied and pro-Soviet regimes in Eastern Europe finally collapsed, and Gorbachev wanted to end the Cold War. Horrified by these developments, in August of 1991 extremist elements among the remaining Communist Party leaders confined Gorbachev to house arrest in his dacha (villa) in the Crimea in what became known as the August Coup. Boris Yeltsin whipped up a violent resistance in Moscow, blockading the conspirators' military vehicles. He even persuaded the commander of a tank battalion to side with the Russians against the Soviets, at one point standing on a tank to address the crowds. The coup was suppressed, and Yeltsin was hailed as a hero.

The failure of the August Coup marked the end of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin entered into agreements with the leaders of other Soviet republics for the dissolution of the USSR, replacing it in December of 1991 with a "Commonwealth of Independent States." On December 25, 1991,

Mikael Gorbachev, who was still the highest Soviet official, officially recognized the bankruptcy and collapse of the Soviet Union. The USSR was dissolved. The extremely powerful socialist state on the Eurasian continent that had influenced world history from 1922 to 1991 disappeared forever, and the Cold War finally came to an end (Theodoros II, 2013).

The seventh factor to examine in this essay on the cessation of Cold War is the Paradigm shift. The notion of new thinking emerged on the 27th Party convention which was conducted in January 1986. The assumption for the resolution as the availability of the weapons of mass destruction which enabled the security and defence issue to be a political task which could be dealt with through political avenues, hence, the relations between United States and the Soviet Union should be built on mutuality and cooperation which bring about a great shift in Soviet philosophy of foreign policy. The idea of new thinking and its contribution to the end of Cold War is based on the honesty and togetherness of the humanity in Soviet Policy, thus, the Soviets become who they are, not through their personal character but through relations with other societies in the international system. This concept help to end the Cold War because the leaders of both the Soviet Union and the United States of America were convinced that collaboration and affinity was the only solution to the long time deadlock of the Cold War (Nyuon, 2012/3).

The eighth factor is the personality of Gorbachev and Reagan, the idiosyncratic variable of two leaders in ending the Cold war. The Reagan concept of the security defence initiative (SDI) made the Soviet Union to be on her knees by prompting Gorbachev leadership to be submissive to the Western power by accepting the independence of the Eastern Europe countries and began to reduce the arms as a signal of ending the Cold War. The Cold war came to an end because of the

personality and power of Gorbachev and the leader of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev introduced two policies which change a lot of things in the Soviet government, first, he relinquished the function of the party by transferring the economic control from the party to the State and secondly, he order for the quick and immediate implantation of the new policy. The Role played by the leaders of the superpowers involved in the Cold war in the end of Cold War is evidenced (Haas, 2007: 145; Nyuon, 2012/3).

American leaders' beliefs that the Cold War was ending corresponded most closely with domestic-ideological and institutional changes in the Soviet Union, and not with changes in Soviet power or international policies. As soon as the most important U.S. decision makers in the Reagan administration believed both that Gorbachev was dedicated to core tenets of liberal ideology – notably greater respect for fundamental human rights-and that these liberal values would likely be made durable by the creation of liberal domestic political institutions, the Americans tended to view their Soviet counterparts as much more trustworthy individuals whose interests were likely to be largely supportive of American interests rather than threats to them. These changes occurred after Soviet foreign policies had become much more cooperative than in previous periods, but before significant reductions in Soviet power and geopolitical influence (Haas, 2007: 146-147).

Reagan was a hardliner with anti-communist regime which made him to work hard to influence his country's public opinion and that of the western countries to overcome Communism. Gorbachev and those who supported his ideas in his government look up to the West as partners to realize international peace through arm control and restriction on arm proliferation to enhance appropriate environment for human living. They legitimized their reforms through political

concessions by their opponents. The concept of Perestroika and Glasnost enabled the people of the United Soviet Socialist Republic to start to undermine the authoritarian regimes. As the society undermine the Communist system, this lead to the collapse of Communism prompting a surprise end to the Cold War (Nyuon, 2012-2013; Kegley & Blanto, 201-2013: 104).

Patrick Glynn, who served in the Reagan administration as Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, has presented the most thorough case for the buildup argument. According to Glynn, Reagan and his advisors came into office rejecting the carrot and stick approach toward the Soviet Union that had been practiced by the Nixon and Carter administrations. Glynn argues that Mikhail Gorbachev's three most dramatic early initiatives, "perestroika," "glasnost," and "detente," were due largely to events in Washington. Perestroika - the restructuring of the Soviet economy and society - came from the realization of Soviet failings which resulted from the contrast between the weakened Soviet military and economic position and the growing power of the United States under Ronald Reagan. Glasnost - the liberalization of Soviet politics - Glynn maintains, "was something of a response to Reagan's claim that democracy was the wave of the future...." Detente with the United States "could be seen, not entirely unfairly," as an effort to reduce tensions in order to forestall the Strategic Defense Initiative, and to disprove Reagan's famous charge that the Soviet Union was an evil empire. In claiming credit for the policies that achieved cold war victory, Reagan supporters give less attention to conditions inside the Soviet Union. The defenders of the most ideologically anti-communist of administrations pay little heed to the economic and political problems generated by seventy years of communist rule. They particularly disparage the role of Mikhail Gorbachev. He is viewed as a "useful idiot," an

individual caught up in events he could not control, more often than not simply reacting to the domestic and outside pressures he inadvertently released in his ill-fated reform effort (Petersen, 1993: 473; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2000-2001: 10ff, Viola, 2002:25ff).

The Soviet Union lost and the U.S. won the Cold War because the U.S. under Reagan, and NATO as a whole (especially Britain's Margaret Thatcher), took a firm stand on the intermediate-range missiles in Europe. The peace movement which opposed this deployment was dead-wrong; if we had followed their advice, we might have ended up in nuclear war or in defeat through Soviet blackmail. This is the opinion of the hawks in the Pentagon and in some academic and independent strategic analysis think-tanks (Newcombe, 1997: 32-33).

Resurgence of Cold War

It has been observed that the Cold War has not really ended with reference to some current international crisis happening in places like Syria, Israel and Palestine, Ukraine among others.

Using the Ukraine crisis as a topic to be expatiated, it is clearly indicative that the Cold War is on though according to Petersen, 1993: 472, President Bush declared:

By the grace of God, America won the cold war." In emphasizing this point, he went on to say that the "cold war did not 'end' - it was won

How true is the statement of President Bush? Per the concept of Cold War, there is no way that ideological conflicts between and among states can cease or be won, though it could be contained for a while, but not forever. The Cold War just decreased at the time but not forever won.

The conflict in Ukraine and the alleged role of Russia in it greatly escalated tensions in the relationship between Russia and major Western powers, especially relations between Russia and the USA, which caused observers to characterize those in 2014 as assuming an adversarial nature, or the advent of Cold War II.

Ukraine had never existed in its present borders before it became part of the Soviet Union. Its current borders are the result of Soviet state-building, which did not take into account the historical and cultural details of its territories just as the partition of Africa, 1884. The decisions had nothing to do with common sense, and were based not on the ideas of harmonious creation, but rather, the ideas of conscious destruction of the territorial communities that existed in the pre-Soviet period. For example, Soviet authorities wanted “to balance out” the Ukrainian peasantry with the industrial workers from Novorossia, and to do so, they merged the territories of what is now eastern and central Ukraine. Or, conversely, they divided the territories of the Great Don Army in order to destroy the identification of Cossacks as an “anti-Soviet” (Valdai Discussion Club, 2014: 7).

The political border between Ukraine’s west and east became markedly pronounced in the second round of the 2010 presidential elections. Kiev and 16 regions voted for Yulia Tymoshenko, who embodied the western choice, whereas nine regions and Sevastopol gave their support to Viktor Yanukovich, who was associated with the pro-Russian choice at that time. In terms of population these two parts of Ukraine are almost equal: 24 million live in the west and 21.3 million in the east (now less 2.3 million of Crimeans) (Valdai Discussion Club, 2014: 15).

Vladimir Putin has long insisted the West is waging a media war against Russia, and Kremlin officials are deeply cynical about the West’s “image management.” Human rights and democracy,

they have told me, are nothing more than “branding” meant to “sell” a nation internationally. As Alexander Smirnov, the Kremlin’s public relations and communications chief, put it in a Moscow interview in February 2012: “If we are talking about democracy, it’s the most expensive brand in the world that you (the U.S.) have created. It’s a million times more expensive than Coca-Cola.” Russia vigorously criticizing U.S. foreign policy and actively reporting on U.S. government violations of civil rights, at home and abroad (Dougherty, 2014:15-16).

According to Dougherty (2014), the Ukraine crisis that erupted in early 2014 has brought an end to the post–Cold War status quo in Europe. Russia, feeling betrayed by its Western partners because of their support for regime change in Kiev, has stepped forward to protect its vital interests—which the West saw as aggression by a revisionist power. According to Dougherty, the ensuing conflict will last long and have an impact far beyond Europe. The Ukraine crisis has ushered in a period of U.S.-Russian rivalry, even confrontation, reminiscent of the nineteenth-century Great Game, a fight for supremacy between the Russian and British Empires. According to Trenin (2014), the political crisis that erupted in Ukraine in early 2014 has ended the period in Russian-Western relations that began with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The Ukraine crisis has opened a new period of heightened rivalry, even confrontation, between former Cold War adversaries. The current crisis has global implications, but, in and of itself, it is not central to the global system (Trenin, 2014: 3).

Summary/Conclusion

The essay has made the possible attempt to outline and discuss the factors that led to the termination of the Cold War. But then the meaning of Cold War, the causes, and the relationship

that existed between the two power blocs were also discussed. Despite the above mentioned factors leading to the end of the Cold War, the cessation of Cold War could be summarized as military, ideological, cultural, economic insufficiency, and deficiency of the moral within the Soviet Union. The Soviet Economic crisis lead to the insolvency of communist ideology which brought about the new thinking within the Communist blocs and lastly, the role of Gorbachev and Reagan cannot be underestimated because without the two leaders, the policies which speed up the cessation of Cold War could have not been achieved. All the factors discussed in this essay that have contributed to the end of Cold War were an initiatives of the leaders themselves, the United States of America and the Soviet Union. In his January, 1992 State of the Union Address, President Bush declared "By the grace of God, America won the cold war." In emphasizing this point, he went on to say that the "cold war did not 'end' - it was won." He then paid homage to the victors, those "who won it, in places like Korea and Vietnam," and to the "American taxpayer [who] bore the brunt of the burden, and deserves a hunk of the glory." What the president neglected to say in his speech was how the United States won the conflict (Petersen, 1993: 472). Powerful states one way or the other try to build the powerful weapon ever to oust the other.

President Bush's remark cannot be substantiated due to the fact that one cannot win over ideological battle differences but can contain or halt it for a while. Cold War behaves like slave insurrection in this 21st century. USA, China, North Korea, Japan and even Israel are all battling ideologically to dominate or build a strong military that no country could challenge all in the name of state or national security. The USA Military cannot say there exist no fear in its camp likewise Russia. There is has a massive Space War as did earlier (the first satellite, Sputnik I, put into in 1957 by the Soviet Union). No nation has deliberately destroyed another's satellite in orbit. But

there is a growing possibility that battles may soon be waged in space. Technological development and test has enhance military weaponization in Russia, USA, China, Japan and the likes (Lamrani, 2016).

Why should a ship from North Korea be prevented from using China' seaports? Why should North Korea be warned of testing nuclear weapons or missiles? Why should USA and Russia build a powerful war jets, submarines, tankers, and the likes? Why should "powerful states" sit at round table to discuss rampant development of arms-race among states? The question can go on and on. There still exist mistrust among states as did the era of post-War II. The issue of marriage of convenience still exist. It will be quite surprising that a liberal-democratic state forms a trade alliance with a communist country. If not for convenience, how on earth will two antithetical political countries come together? I do not know whether China is now Communist-Liberal Democratic country or something else.

This new era of Cold War is very crucial and should be a topic for daily discussion. Like I said, it is behaving like slave insurrection. It has taken a covert course. Sooner than later it may resort into obvert course. The danger of World War III is likely to be experienced as Cold War II keeps on metamorphosing. The issue of ISIL (ISIS) is another broad topic debunk the idea that Cold War or ideological battle has ended. It has been even characterized by brute force.

Difference in ideologies among states will continue to exist but the most important thing the world should do is to try and keep their differences to themselves for the sake of world peace. We are the good God and the bad God of the world. We make our own choices. Circumstances of today is as result of the choices made yesterday. Is a joke to think that some supernatural being will restore the earth to peace if we keep on to make bad choices. The earth burns because of us, it bleeds

blood because of our actions, and suspicions abounds because of our own actions. If there were a better place than earth we would have been there. And if there should be any sort of friendship, it must be all inclusive business and not just a *bilateral* or few *multilateral* agenda.

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